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This paper analyzes the dynamics of trade policy reform under democracy. In an overlapping 
generations model, heterogeneous agents may acquire skills when young, thereby determining 
the skill composition of their cohort. Current and anticipated trade policies influence 
education decisions, and thus the identity of the median voter. We show that there may exist 
two political steady states: one protectionist and one liberal. Transition from the former to the 
latter can be achieved by government announcements, temporary educational subsidies, or 
(exogenous) tariff liberalization by trading partners, but not, in general, by transfer payments 
to adversely affected workers. We find additionally that reform is politically feasible only if 
the proposed liberalization is sufficiently large, suggesting that radical reform may be 
necessary for escaping a “protectionist rut.” 
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1 Introduction
Trade liberalization is an inherently dynamic political process, the path to reform charac-
terized by di±cult and often unpopular labor market adjustments that may give rise to
political foot dragging, or even backsliding. In the presence of populist voter pressure, pro-
posed liberalization programs that commence with great fanfare and optimism may easily
(and frequently do) succumb to public backlash. In democratic political environments {
which are necessarily subject to constant legislative reevaluation { generational di®erences,
evolving expectations, and di®erent workers' abilities to adapt to changing market condi-
tions surely are paramount in determining the ultimate success or failure of liberalization
e®orts.
It is particularly surprising, then, that most theoretical accounts of endogenous trade
policy limit themselves to static models.1 Our paper takes a di®erent approach, highlighting
the potential importance of voters' future expectations and intergenerational di®erences in
a dynamic political economy model while maintaining a parsimonious analytical structure
customary to the trade literature. We develop a two period overlapping generations (OLG)
model with endogenous skill acquisition in which agents vote every period on a referendum
to adjust the current trade policy or to maintain the status quo. When deciding whether to
acquire skills, heterogenous agents within each generational cohort take into account current
and expected trade policies, since domestic relative prices determine wages and thus the
anticipated return to acquiring skills. The model exhibits a feedback mechanism in which
trade policy determines the skill composition of the population - and hence the identity of
the median voter - who in turn votes on trade policy.
In the referendum, voters choose between two economic states of the world, a rel-
atively protectionist regime or its more liberal counterpart. Given the population's skill
composition at the time of the vote and the expected trade regime in the future, we ¯nd
1An important empirical exception is a recent paper by Magee, Davidson, and Matusz (2005), who exam-
ine the relationship between labor market characteristics and measures of voters' trade preferences. Their
paper convincingly articulates an intuitive connection between trade adjustment costs and U.S. congressional
campaign contributions, but stops short of developing a formal model.1 INTRODUCTION 3
the potential for multiple political steady states, which are de¯ned as economic equilibria
under which the median voter would elect to maintain the status quo trade policy. The
multiplicity of equilibria obtains because the existing policy regime a®ects not only the skill
acquisition choices of the young generation, but also the identity of the median voter. The
more protectionist the existing policy, the greater the unskilled proportion of the older gen-
eration (which unambiguously opposes reform), and thus the lower the relative skill level
of the median voter among her younger (pivotal) cohort. Intuitively, status quo trade pol-
icy enjoys the power of hysteresis through the past skill acquisition decisions of the older
generation.2
When the model generates multiple political steady states, voters may get stuck in a
\protectionist rut" even though the country as a whole would be better o® under the more
liberal regime, itself a politically sustainable equilibrium. Given that there are potential
Pareto gains from freer trade, transition from the relatively protectionist regime to a more
liberal policy should be feasible. We show that transition can be achieved by credible policy
announcements as well as temporary educational subsidies that tilt the balance towards the
more liberal policy path. Traditional trade adjustment assistance through temporary trans-
fer payments, on the other hand, is counter-productive since it adversely a®ects workers'
skill acquisition decisions. Furthermore, we show that the political feasibility of transition
increases in the magnitude of the tari® liberalization, and also in the presence of \recip-
rocal" reforms by trading partners. Radical policy changes, and multilaterally negotiated
liberalization steps, thus may be more likely to be approved than small or unilateral reforms.
Our approach and results | though novel to the trade literature | are motivated in
part by recent work in macroeconomics. In particular, our approach is similar to that in Has-
sler, Rodr¶ ³guez Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003) who analyze domestic redistributive
policies, and relates to quantitative models by Bassetto (1999), Saint Paul (2001), Krusell
and R¶ ³os-Rull (1996), and Krusell, Quadrini, and R¶ ³os-Rull (1996). These authors ¯nd, as
2This ¯nding is an interesting complement to Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), who demonstrated the
potential for \status quo bias" in the presence of voter uncertainty about their future gains or losses from
proposed reform. Our model generates the same result under perfect foresight through political interaction
across generations.1 INTRODUCTION 4
we do, the potential for multiple equilibria, and the Hassler, Rodr¶ ³guez Mora, Storesletten,
and Zilibotti (2003) model in particular shares the feature that the identity of the current
constituency supporting a proposed policy depends on the current policy framework. Or-
tega (2004) uses a similar approach to analyze the nexus between immigration policy and
redistribution, yet skill acquisition is entirely stochastic in his model. Earlier papers that
feature a feedback loop between public policy and individual behavior include Glomm and
Ravikumar (1995), Saint Paul and Verdier (1997), and Benabou (2000). Our model di®ers
from this earlier work in a number of dimensions; perhaps most notably, intergenerational
political frictions in voting are a key element in our model, whereas previous studies assume
that the young do not vote, so that the median voter does not have a stake in the future
economy.
Though inspired by innovations in dynamic political economy, the present paper re-
lates to a wide body of the trade literature. Our model is reminiscent of the two-period
model in Staiger and Tabellini (1987) who analyze the time consistency of trade policy.
Maggi and Rodr¶ ³quez-Clare (1998) and Maggi and Rodr¶ ³guez-Clare (2006) consider the po-
litical economy e®ects of prior investments { in their case by forward looking ¯rms rather
than short lived workers as in our model { on endogenous trade policy. Also similar to our
work, McLaren (2002) analyzes the possibility of welfare reducing endogenous policy lock-in
in a multi-country setting with preferential trade liberalization. Most recently, Krishna and
Mitra (2006) develop a two country median voter model of endogenous trade liberalization;
their setting is static, however, and so does not give rise to multiple political equilibria in
a unilateral context as ours does. Related in their emphasis on the interaction between
worker heterogeneity and trade costs are the careful analyses by Yeaple (2005) and Ohn-
sorge and Tre°er (2004), though both of these papers consider a static framework in which
trade policy is exogenous.
In addition, there are important contributions to the trade literature that feature an
OLG setup but stop short of endogenizing trade policy. Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983)
present an OLG model in continuous time where agents decide on human capital acquisition.
Borsook (1987) introduces heterogenous agents in such a framework and Falvey, Greenaway,1 INTRODUCTION 5
and Silva (2007) allow for skill acquisition later in life to analyze the role of age in trade
adjustment. Though not a trade paper per se, Eicher (1996) touches on a similar set of issues
in his elegant study of the interaction between skill acquisition decisions and endogenous
technological innovation in a full OLG framework. Matsuyama (1992) uses a similar setup
where agents, whose comparative advantage di®ers across sectors, decide up-front which
sector to enter. Interestingly, his closing sentence advocates future work to analyze the
\dynamic formation of commercial policy."
Instead of using a full OLG model, numerous trade studies consider a ¯nite sequence of
time periods where heterogenous agents can make decisions. Davidson, Matusz, and Nelson
(2005) show that the relative timing of decisions on trade liberalization and compensation
can lead to di®erent policy outcomes. Bougheas and Riezman (2005) analyze how the
distribution of human capital determines the respective trade policies of two countries.
Willmann (2004) shows how the attempt to compensate the losers from liberalization can
undermine the gains from trade due to strategic underinvestment in human capital. In a
similar spirit, Long, Riezman, and Soubeyran (2007) analyze how trade liberalization a®ects
the acquistion of sector speci¯c human capital.
Dynamic models have also been used to study the labor market aspects of trade
policy. Davidson and Matusz (2004) present an OLG model that features a search process
to enter the higher value sector, whereas Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999) employ a
continious time model with in¯nitely lived agents, and Davidson and Matusz (2006) focus
on the transition between steady states. In a similar spirit, Cameron, Chaudhuri, and
McLaren (2002), Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2003), and Artuc (2006) use dynamic
stochastic models of labor movement to study intersectoral adjustment costs facing workers
subsequent to trade policy changes. This work lies at the intersection between the trade
literature and labor economics, however, and is methodologically distant from the model
developed here.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model and establishes the
conditions under which multiple political steady states exist. Section 3 then describes the
potential for transition between steady states, focussing ¯rst on the role of expectations and2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 6
then on active policy prescriptions for inducing reform. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Model of Political Stasis
The model is designed to capture a dynamic environment in which both current and fu-
ture trade policy in°uence individuals' skill acquisition decisions and voting behavior. Our
approach highlights the importance of current policy in determining both the existing skill
composition of workers { and thus the identity (not just the policy preference) of the me-
dian voter { and the intra- and inter-generational political friction borne of di®erent abilities
to adjust between unskilled and skilled work. The model allows formal evaluation of the
endogeneity of voters' preferences and choices with current and expected economic condi-
tions, representing how voters populations may evolve in response to changing economic
conditions.
Equilibrium in this model has two components: economic and political. We begin in
Section 2.1 by de¯ning an economic equilibrium as the skill composition and production
levels that would result from an exogenous time path of tari®s; an economic steady state is
then just the economic equilibrium that would obtain under a constant exogenous tari® level.
Section 2.2 then endogenizes the political process to evaluate the existence, properties, and
potential multiplicity of Markov perfect political equilibria and political steady states. As in
Krishna and Mitra (2006) we ¯rst develop the model without inclusion of tari® revenue to
simplify the analytical exposition. Appendix B demonstrates the robustness of the results
to (lump sum) redistribution of tari® revenue.3
2.1 The Model Economy
The model consists of a small open economy that may produce, consume, and trade two
goods: a skill-based good, S, which requires skilled labor to produce, and a basic good,
U, produced using unskilled labor. Let good S be the economy's natural export good.
3Redistribution through non-uniform tari® revenue rebates is analytically equivalent to the tax and
transfer scheme discussed in Section 3.2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 7
Designating U as numeraire, the domestic relative price of good S then is given by p ´
pw
¿ ,
where pw represents the exogenous world relative price and ¿ is de¯ned as one plus the ad-
valorem tari® on the basic good. Both goods are produced under perfect competition with
constant returns to scale technologies. There is no uncertainty in the model and borrowing
and lending are ruled out.4
The economy's population consists of a continuum of agents with ex-ante heteroge-
neous natural abilities and rational expectations with perfect foresight. Agents live for two
periods; thus at any point in time, two generations, the `young' and the `old', comprise the
total population. Every generation is assumed to be the same size, with mass normalized
to one. Individuals of each generation are indexed by a 2 [0;1] according to ability level.
We assume that within each generation, the distribution of ability levels is uniform over the
unit interval; i.e. a » U[0;1]. Agent a = 0 is the least able of her generation, and agent
a = 1 the most able.
Every agent is endowed with one unit of labor in each period of life. At birth, each
individual chooses either to remain unskilled for her lifetime, or to acquire skills at a constant
¯xed education cost c 2 [0;1] units of labor. If an agent elects to remain unskilled, she
(inelastically) supplies one unit of unskilled labor in each period of her life. If instead she
chooses to earn an education, she supplies the (1 ¡ c) units of unskilled labor that remain
after paying for education when young, and subsequently (1 + a) e±ciency units of skilled
labor when old. Comparing the sectoral mobility of both age groups, note that agents
are assumed to be free to choose between sectors when young, while they are sectorally
immobile when old.5
In terms of production technology, we assume an extreme form of factor speci¯city in
the production functions for both goods: the basic good is produced only from unskilled
4Given the structure of the model, agents are unable to make binding future commitments to each other,
across or within generations. In assuming the voters cannot commit to future political positions or voting
behaviors we follow Hassler et al (2003), among others.
5Falvey, Greenaway, and Silva (2007) who allow agents to earn an education at any point along a con-
tinuous time dimension show that sectoral mobility does decrease in age.2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 8
labor and the skill-based good solely from skilled labor.6 Assuming constant returns to scale
and choosing units appropriately, the unskilled wage corresponds to the price of the basic
good (normalized to one), and the wage for one e±ciency unit of skilled labor corresponds
to the price of the skill-based good, denoted by p. Note that this extreme form of factor
speci¯city comes into play only after agents have chosen their factor supply.7
An agent will acquire skills only if doing so will maximize her lifetime indirect utility.
Preferences are identical across individuals and functionally separable across time. Let each










u) denotes the individual's
consumption of good S (U) when she is young, and co
s(co
u) her consumption of good S (U)
when old. We assume intratemporal utility is a function of current consumption, given
by u(cu;cs) ´ c®
sc1¡®
u , so that the corresponding within-period indirect utility function is
v(p;I) ´ Kp¡®I, where K ´ ®®(1 ¡ ®)1¡® > 0, I denotes current nominal income, and
® 2 (0;1).
By choice of units, one unit of unskilled labor produces exactly one unit of the basic
good, so that the nominal wage to unskilled labor is normalized to one for all agents. From
the assumption that one unit of skilled labor by agent a produces (1 + a) units of good S,
perfect competition implies that the nominal skilled wage to agent a at time t is (1 + a)pt.
Thus, as a function of current and (perfectly) anticipated prices, pt and pt+1, a given agent
a will acquire skills only if:
v(pt;1 ¡ c) + ¯v(pt+1;(1 + a)pt+1) ¸ v(pt;1) + ¯v(pt+1;1): (2.2)
From 2.2 and the functional form of the sub-utility function in 2.1 we can de¯ne the
6Unskilled workers cannot produce skill-based goods, and no established skilled (second generation)
worker would revert to unskilled good production as long as the skill premium is positive, which is implied
in autarky by the Cobb-Douglas structure of preferences assumed momentarily, and under trade by the
assumption that S is the natural export good.
7As in Matsuyama (1992) it simpli¯es the analysis by reducing the dimensionality of the price vector and
relieves us of resorting to the Stolper{Samuelson result.2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 9
threshold agent, ^ at under a diversi¯ed equilibrium, as the member of the young generation
at time t who is just indi®erent between remaining unskilled and getting an education,
given the discount rate, the cost of education, the preference parameter ®, and current and
anticipated tari®s:







¯pw ¿t+1 ¡ 1
¾
: (2.3)
Note that the corner solution in which all agents acquire skills, ^ a = 0, does not imply a
specialized economy (as long as c < 1), since all workers are assumed to be unskilled while
young. The assumption that the country has comparative advantage in production of the
skill-based good ensures that ^ a < 1.
Based on the critical value in (2.3), we can summarize the educational decisions of
any agent as follows:
Proposition 2.1 An agent of generation t with ability level a 2 [0;1] remains unskilled for
life if a · ^ a(¿t;¿t+1), and acquires skills otherwise.
Because each generation of agents is mapped to the unit interval with a uniform distri-
bution, ^ a also equals the proportion of unskilled workers in each generation. For notational
convenience, we de¯ne an economic equilibrium in terms of the equilibrium proportion of
each generation that acquires skills: µt ´ 1 ¡ ^ at. Output of each good at time t then may
be written as a function of the skill composition of the old (generation t¡1) and the young
(generation t). Since the parameters (pw;¯;c;®) are assumed to be ¯xed and exogenous,
we suppress these arguments in de¯nitions hereafter.
De¯nition 2.1 Economic Equilibrium. As a function of an exogenous tari® sequence,
an economic equilibrium is characterized by the currently young and older generations' skill2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 10
composition and current levels of production over time in each sector so that 8t:























Since the model assumes a small open economy,8 the de¯nition of an economic steady
state is trivial. Equilibrium is determined uniquely by the last period, current, and next-
period tari®s; thus, if the tari® is ¯xed (and this is understood by voters), an economic
steady state is reached. Formally:
De¯nition 2.2 Economic Steady State. The steady state economic equilibrium under
a constant, exogenous, tari® level, ¿ is characterized by a constant skill composition across
generations and a constant level of production over time in each sector according to:
µ(¿) = 2 ¡
¯ + c
¯pw ¿; (2.8)
qu(µ) = 2 ¡ (1 + c)µ; (2.9)




2.2 The Political Process
We model the political process as a direct democracy over trade policy.9 At the beginning of
each period, every agent in the population { young and old { votes on current trade policy,
which subsequently determines the wages and prices for that period. Agents have complete
information and perfect foresight when they make their voting decisions. We adopt a binary
8The derivation of the autarkic steady state and autarkic steady state price is o®ered in the appendix.
9Other forms of political competition would of course change the analysis considerably, but we argue that
the qualitative underpinning of our ¯ndings { that there exists a feedback mechanism between economic
policy outcomes and endogenous policy decisions that can lead to multiple equilibria and political stasis {
would obtain for a broad class of political economy models.2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 11
referendum framework;10 agents can vote either to maintain the status quo tari® policy, ¿o,
or to switch to some alternate regime, ¿0. The two possible tari® regimes, denoted ¿L and
¿P, are for now taken as given, assumed to be ¯xed by a third party agenda setter whose
objectives are the focus of Section 3. Without loss of generality, let ¿L < ¿P and think of
the former as the liberal and the latter as the protectionist tari®. We de¯ne the reform step
as ¢ ´ ¿o ¡ ¿0, so that ¢ > 0 represents a trade liberalization from ¿P to ¿L, while ¢ < 0
would imply a protectionist shift from ¿L to ¿P. We assume that there is no bureaucratic
or time cost of changing tari® regimes.
Trade policy is determined by majority vote. In the case of a tie, we assume that
the status quo is maintained. If half or more of the population (mass ¸ 1; recalling that
the mass of the total population is 2) votes in favor of the status quo tari® policy the
tari® regime remains unchanged and the existing tari® regime is deemed politically stable.
If instead the majority votes for reform, the tari® switches to the proposed alternative
regime immediately. As in any majoritarian voting model, the median voter{ hereafter
with characteristics denoted by superscript M{ is decisive.
We de¯ne a political equilibrium to be any economic equilibrium in which agents'
expected time path of tari®s would be maintained endogenously under the existing political
process. As in Hassler, Rodr¶ ³guez Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003), we restrict
attention to Markov perfect equilibria, requiring that voters' behavior depends only on
payo® relevant state variables.11 In the context of this model, the state variables include the
¯xed parameters, pw;¯;c; and ®, and the existing skill composition of the older generation,
10The assumption of a binary referendum framework is less restrictive than it may ¯rst appear to be. As
demonstrated later in this section, agents in our model have extreme policy preferences{ every worker (with
the exception of one (zero mass) \indi®erent voter") strictly prefers complete protection (autarky) or the
free trade (and indeed, import subsidies if possible). Thus, if the median voter was permitted to choose
her most preferred tari® (in essence, deciding the structure of the referendum), she would choose one trade
policy extreme or the other rather than some intermediate tari®. Since interior tari®s would never be chosen
by a median voter, the binary referendum structure we adopt imposes little loss of generality. This issue is
discussed further in Section 3.5
11By requiring Markov perfect voting strategies, we e®ectively rule out the potential for stochastic beliefs
that can generate sun-spot equilibria. We discuss the potential role of changing beliefs in Section 3.1.2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 12
which will determine the identity of the median voter (demonstrated below). Recalling that
the skill composition of the older generation at time t is denoted µt¡1, we then have the
following:
De¯nition 2.3 Political Equilibrium. A Markov perfect political equilibrium is de¯ned
by a policy rule, ¿t = T(µt¡1), where T : [0;1] ! f¿P;¿Lg is a time-invariant mapping
from the current skill composition of the older generation to the current voting outcome and
µt¡1 = µ(¿t¡1), where µ : f¿P;¿Lg ! [0;1] is a time invariant mapping from the status quo
(last period) tari® to the current skill composition of the older generation such that 8t:
1. T(µt¡1) = argmax¿t2f¿P;¿Lg V M
t (¿t;¿t+1;aM;pw;¯;c;®) s.t. ¿t+1 = T(µ(¿t)) and






¯pw ¿t+1, s.t. ¿t+1 = T(µ(¿t)).
The ¯rst condition requires that the median voter at time t chooses the current tari®
¿t 2 f¿P;¿Lg to maximize her lifetime indirect utility, V M
t (¢), with the rational expectation
that the next period's tari® will depend on the implied skill composition of the currently
young cohort according to the same policy mapping, T. The second condition requires that
the skill composition of each cohort is determined in (economic) equilibrium as in (2.4),
again subject to the rational expectation that ¿t+1 = T(µ(¿t)).
We de¯ne a political steady state to be any economic steady state in which the status
quo policy (hereafter denoted by ¿o ´ ¿t¡1) would be maintained endogenously under
the existing political process. Thus, a political steady state de¯ned under the referendum
structure given by the tari® pair (¿L;¿P) is an economic steady state given by (2.8) - (2.10)
under either initial tari® regime, ¿o 2 f¿L;¿Pg, in which the median voter would elect
to maintain the status quo tari® policy over the competitive equilibrium that would arise
under the proposed alternative. Formally:
De¯nition 2.4 Political Steady State. A political steady state is reached when ¿t ´
T(µ(¿t¡1)) = ¿t¡1. A political steady state is summarized by the (constant) skill composition
of the population under the steady state tari®, ¹ ¿:
µ(¹ ¿) = 2 ¡
¯ + c
¯pw ¹ ¿: (2.11)2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 13
Our framework provides a straightforward environment for evaluating political equilib-
ria. We begin by arranging both generations of voters over the uniform population interval
[0;2] in weakly ascending order of each individual's preference for trade openness; the most
protectionist voters are indexed closest to zero, the most liberal are indexed closest to 2.
We can then exploit the structure of the model to characterize the identities of two key
voters among the population at any given time: the median voter, whose vote is decisive
in the referendum, and the indi®erent voter, who separates the population between those
who prefer the more protectionist regime, and those who would prefer the more liberal
tari® policy. We consider the trade policy preferences of each generation in turn, allowing
us to map individuals to the population interval by weakly increasing preference for trade
openness.
Older Voters. It is immediate that members of the older generation will be polarized in the
trade policy debate. Because older workers are intersectorally immobile, the older unskilled
(import-competing) workers have an unambiguous preference for the highest possible tari®
(autarky), while all of the older skilled workers prefer the smallest tari® possible. (For
semantic convenience we will refer to this as free trade, keeping in mind that it could be
a trade subsidy in the absence of a non-negativity constraint on the tari®.) Restating, we
have that:
Proposition 2.2 Among the older generation, political support for the liberal tari® regime
is non-decreasing in ability level: the unskilled (lower ability) older agents strictly prefer the
protectionist regime, while the skilled (higher ability) older agents strictly prefer the more
liberal tari® policy.
To con¯rm that the most preferred trade policy by any older worker is necessarily a
corner solution, simply note that the indirect utility of older unskilled (skilled) workers is
strictly decreasing (increasing) in the local relative price according to:
V u;o = v(p;1) = Kp¡®1; (2.12)
V s;o = v(p;(1 + a)p) = Kp1¡®(1 + a): (2.13)2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 14
Starting from an economic equilibrium at time t in which the skill composition of
older workers is given by µt¡1, fraction (1 ¡ µt¡1) of the older generation unambiguously
favors autarky and thus can be \lined up" on the left-most end of the [0;2] population
interval. Likewise, proportion µt¡1 of the older generation is unambiguously pro free trade
and therefore can be stacked at the top end of the population interval. Accordingly, the
younger generation spans the population interval from [1 ¡ µt¡1;2 ¡ µt¡1]. It is immediate
that the median voter must be a member of the young generation; by de¯nition, the median
voter is the individual at the center of the population interval (namely agent j = 1) and
since µt¡1 · 1 by de¯nition, the young generation necessarily spans the median of the
overall population.
Young Voters. Assessing the trade policy preferences of the pivotal younger generation is
somewhat more involved than for the older cohort because, unlike their older counterparts,
the young can adjust their educational decisions in response to the current realization of
tari® policy. It is still the case that every agent's most preferred tari® will be characterized
by a corner solution so that the young generation, like the old, can be divided into those
who unambiguously prefer protectionism and those wholeheartedly in favor of free trade.
But from there the story is complicated by the endogeneity of the skill acquisition decision.
Intuitively, the young agents of each natural ability level can be characterized as either
lifetime net producers or net consumers of the basic good, depending on the current and
anticipated tari® levels. Members of the former group will favor protectionism (the lower
the relative price of the skill-based good, the better) while the lifetime net suppliers of skill-
based goods may or may not prefer free trade, depending on the cost of education relative
to higher expected wages from freer trade in the second period of life.
A simple observation provides substantial leverage in evaluating both the structure
of trade policy preferences among the young generation and the characteristics of political
equilibria. Notice that for any ¯xed future tari®, every young voter would strictly prefer
protectionism in the current period.12 (Recall that all workers are assumed to provide
12Under the extreme parametric assumption that c = 1 such that agents cannot earn wages as unskilled
workers when undergoing skill-acquisition process, young future-skilled workers would be indi®erent over2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 15
unskilled labor in the ¯rst period of life regardless of whether or not they undergo training
to become skilled workers in the future.) Thus, even a pro-reform young voter would
strictly prefer \protection today and free trade tomorrow" to \free trade today and free
trade tomorrow." This implies that the only reason that a young voter would vote for
liberalization in the current period is to in°uence the voting outcome in the next period.
This universal preference for high tari®s while young (again, holding future tari®
policy ¯xed) allows us to rule out the possibility of a protectionist shift from ¿L to ¿P in
political equilibrium, which implies in turn that we can rule out the possibility of temporary
deviations from either status quo policy.13 If the median voter expects protection in the
future, she would never vote for the liberal regime in the current period; we therefore
can rule out the possibility of temporary liberalization in political equilibrium. A similar
argument rules out the possibility of temporary protection: if starting from a liberal regime,
a young voter at time t expected that she could deviate to protection, then her predecessor
at t¡1 must have anticipated this behavior and voted for protection as well, contradicting
the initial assumption a liberal status quo at time t.
Since temporary deviations from the status quo cannot occur in equilibrium, we can
reduce young voters' policy preferences to a choice between permanent maintenance of the
status quo versus a permanent and immediate shift to the proposed alternate regime. To
characterize how trade policy preferences depend on young voters' skill acquisition deci-
sions, we categorize the young generation into three groups: those who would upgrade their
skills under either policy regime (the high ability agents), those who would educate them-
selves only under the more liberal policy regime (the middle ability agents), and those who
would remain unskilled under either regime (the low ability agents). Using ^ aP ´ ^ a(¿P;¿P)
(^ aL ´ ^ a(¿L;¿L)) to denote the ability of the threshold agent under a current and future
protectionist (liberal) regime according to (2.3), and recalling that ^ a is increasing in ¿ (the
greater the level of import protection, the higher the ability of the threshold agent and the
¯rst-period trade policy (holding second period trade policy ¯xed).
13That is, we can rule out the possibility of political equilibria that include tari® sequences ¿t¡1 ! ¿t =
¿L ! ¿P. The temporary deviation time paths: ¿t¡1 ! ¿t ! ¿t+1 = ¿L ! ¿P ! ¿L or ¿P ! ¿L ! ¿P, are
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lower the skill composition of the population) so that ^ aP ¸ ^ aL,14 the three types of agents
are sorted on the generational unit interval as summarized in the following proposition.
Figure 1 illustrates.
Proposition 2.3 For any pair of tari® alternatives, f¿L;¿Pg, there are three types of of
young agents:
i) low ability agents with ability a · ^ aL, who would remain unskilled under either con-
stant (current and future) tari® regime, ¿L or ¿P;
ii) middle ability agents with ability a 2 (^ aL;^ aP], who would acquire skills under the
liberal regime but not under the protectionist regime; and
iii) high ability agents with a > ^ aP, who would acquire skills under either (current and
future) tari® regime, ¿L or ¿P.
The lowest ability members of the young generation are the easiest to evaluate, so we
start there. Since these least able workers will remain unskilled under either tari® policy,
the low ability agents unambiguously favor protectionism. Thus, we can stack fraction
^ aL of the young generation alongside their older counterparts on the left hand side of the
population interval.
The middle ability agents, those with ability levels a 2 (^ aL;^ aP], will educate only
under the expectation of the more liberal tari® regime. The proportion of the middle
ability group that supports the more liberal tari® regime (if any) depends on the tradeo®
between ¯rst period unskilled wages and education cost and second period income. This
friction between current and future real earnings does not imply, however, that individually
optimal tari®s are interior; quite the opposite, the members of the middle ability group
prefer either autarky or free trade depending on prices and parameters (including education
cost and the discount factor) and their individual speci¯c ability level. A middle ability
14The inequality is weak only in the corner scenario in which all agents would choose to acquire skills
under both tari® regimes; i.e. ^ aP = ^ aL = 0.2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 17
Figure 1: Young Generation Ability Types
agent will vote in favor of the more liberal regime if:




L (1 + ¯) ¡ (1 ¡ c)
¯pw ¿L ¡ 1: (2.14)
This expression demonstrates that the higher ability agents within the group would be the
¯rst to support freer trade. This is intuitive; the higher an agent's ability, the higher her
skilled wage and hence the greater her expected gains from liberalization.
Interestingly, the highest ability agents of the young generation will not necessarily
favor free trade. This ambiguity in trade policy preferences is again driven by friction
between unskilled earnings in the ¯rst stage of life and skilled earnings in the second period
of life. Like the rest of the population, each high ability agent's most preferred trade policy
is characterized by a corner solution. A high ability agent a 2 (^ aP;1] will support the more2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 18
liberal regime (¿L) if:









¯pw ¡ 1: (2.15)
Thus, we again ¯nd that the highest ability agents among the group will be the ¯rst in
line to support liberalization. The expressions in (2.14) and (2.15) coincide at the border
between the high and middle ability groups (where a = ^ aP) so that if (2.14) or (2.15) holds
with equality for some a0 2 (^ aL;1], then (2.14) ((2.15)) holds with strict equality for all
agents a 2 (a0;aP] (a > a0 \ (^ aP;1]) and is violated for all a < a0.
We summarize our ¯ndings as follows:
Proposition 2.4 Among the young generation, the political support for the liberal tari®
regime is non-decreasing in ability level;
i) Low ability agents with a 2 [0;^ aL) strictly prefer the protectionist regime;
ii) of the middle ability agents with a 2 [^ aL;^ aP), those with individual ability less (greater)




¯pw ¿L ¡ 1 prefer the high (low) tari®,
iii) of the high ability agents with a 2 [^ aP;1], those with individual ability less (greater)








¯pw ¡ 1 prefer the high (low) tari®.
This proposition implies that the young voters can be indexed over the population
interval in increasing ability type. For any initial skill composition of the older generation,
µt¡1, then, the young generation can be arranged ascending in ability type over the interval
[1¡µt¡1;2¡µt¡1] of the population support [0;2]. Based on this ordering we can identify and
compare, ¯rst, the indi®erent agent who separates the protectionists from the free-traders
and, second, the median voter.
The Indi®erent Voter. We de¯ne the indi®erent voter to be the (zero mass) individual
who separates the population between the protectionists and the free traders. It is clear
that the indi®erent voter is neither a member of the young low ability type nor of the2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 19
older generation, since all of these individuals strictly prefer autarky or free trade. The
indi®erent voter therefore must be a member of the young generation in either the middle
or high ability groups. Using ~ a to label the ability level of this delineating individual, we
note that if the indi®erent voter is a middle ability type so that ~ a 2 (^ aL;^ aP], then she is




L (1 + ¯) ¡ (1 ¡ c)
¯pw ¿L ¡ 1: (2.16)










¯pw ¡ 1: (2.17)
For any quadruple of parameter values, (¯;c;®;pw) and pair of tari® alternatives, (¿L;¿P),
then, the system of equations (2.16)-(2.17) pins down the indi®erent voter:
Proposition 2.5 The indi®erent agent is a young voter of middle or high ability. If ~ am 2
[^ aL;^ aP), she is a middle ability agent and if ~ ah 2 [^ aP;1], she is high ability.
Notice that because the indi®erent voter is young, her identity is independent of the
status quo tari® policy or the skill composition of the older generation.
The Median Voter. Since fraction 1 ¡ µ1¡t · 1 of the older generation is protectionist
and the young voters are mapped to the population interval increasing in ability type, the
identity of the median voter is immediate:
Proposition 2.6 The median voter at time t is the member of the young generation with
ability level aM
t ´ aM(¿t¡1;¿t) = µt¡1. Furthermore, the median voters is of lower ability
under protectionism than under the liberal regime: aM(¿P;¿P) < aM(¿L;¿L).
The identity of the median voter therefore depends on both the status quo and realized
contemporary tari® regimes through the skill composition of the older generation. As
one might expect, the ability level of the median voter is decreasing the measure of older2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 20
unskilled workers (1¡µt¡1); the greater the vested interest in a high tari® among the older
generation, the more di±cult it will be to implement tari® liberalization, since only a small
proportion of the young vote is needed to block a proposed reform. Conversely, the greater
the skill composition of the older workers, the higher the ability of the median voter and
the better the chance for the liberal regime. Figure 2 summarizes.
Figure 2: The Population Interval by Trade Policy Preference
2.3 Political Equilibria
We evaluate the existence of political equilibria by comparing the relative position of the
median and indi®erent voters on the population interval. If the the indi®erent voter lies
to the left of the median voter, then the median voter will favor free trade and thus vote
in the liberal regime; if instead the indi®erent voter lies to the right of the median voter,
the protectionist regime will succeed in the referendum. The key is to recognize that under
rational expectations and individually optimal skill acquisition decisions, the identity of2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 21
the median voter depends on both the status quo and realized tari® regimes according to
Proposition 2.6. In contrast, the identity of the indi®erent voter is independent of the
status quo tari®, pinned down on the population interval for any pair of tari® alternatives
by ~ a(¿L;¿P).
For any pair of possible tari® regimes, ¿L and ¿P, the equilibrium skill composition
of the older generation can take three possible values: µ(¿P;¿P); µ(¿L;¿L); or µ(¿P;¿L);
depending on the status quo and current tari® policy.15 Following Proposition 2.6, there
are then three possible median voters identi¯ed on the population interval: the young
agents with ability aM(¿P;¿P); aM(¿P;¿L); and aM(¿L;¿L). From (2.4), we verify that
aM(¿P;¿P) < aM(¿P;¿L) < aM(¿L;¿L); intuitively, the ability level of the median voter
will be lowest when the older generation makes its skill acquisition decisions under the
expectation of lifetime protectionist trade policy, and highest when older workers anticipate
a lifetime of freer trade. For any set of parameter values and tari® alternatives, the position
of the the indi®erent voter among these potential median voters determines the set of
political equilibrium possibilities. There are three important cases to consider, which we
characterize as follows:
Proposition 2.7 Depending on the relative position of the indi®erent and median voters
over the young generation interval, there are three possibilities:
i) aM(¿L;¿L) < ~ a: the steady state with ¿t = ¿P8t is the unique politically stable equilib-
rium.
ii) ~ a < aM(¿P;¿P): the steady state with ¿t = ¿L8t is the unique politically stable equilib-
rium.
iii) aM(¿P;¿P) · ~ a · aM(¿L;¿L): both steady states, ¿t = ¿P8t and ¿t = ¿L8t, are politi-
cally stable equilibria.
15Recall that µ(¿L;¿P) can be eliminated immediately from the discussion of political equilibria, pursuant
to the discussion on page 15, which rules out the possibility of a protectionist shift from ¿L to ¿P in any
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The ¯rst two are simple but relatively uninteresting scenarios in which the unique
political equilibrium is characterized by a political steady state under either ¿L or ¿P. First,
if the indi®erent voter lies to the right of all three potential median voter ability levels so
that every potential median would voter favor the protectionist regime, the unique political
equilibrium is characterized by the political steady state under ¿P according to (2.11). The
second possibility is the opposite extreme in which the median voter lies to the left of all
three potential median voters such that political steady state under ¿L the unique political
equilibrium. These possibilities are depicted in Panels A and B in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Political Steady States
The focus of this paper is of course the intermediate possibility in which the indi®erent
voter lies between the median voter that would obtain under either steady state tari® policy
(i.e. ~ a(¿L;¿P) 2 [aM(¿P;¿P);aM(¿L;¿L)] as in Panel C of Figure 3) so that there exist
multiple political steady states; starting from a protectionist status quo the median voter
would vote to maintain protection, while starting from the liberal status quo policy, the
median voter would vote to maintain the lower tari®.2 A MODEL OF POLITICAL STASIS 23
The case of multiple political steady states consists of two possible scenarios{ in the
¯rst, aM(¿P;¿P) < aM(¿P;¿L) < ~ a(¿L;¿P) < aM(¿L;¿L); in this instance, the two politi-
cal steady states are the only forms of political equilibria.16 The remaining case in which
aM(¿P;¿P) < ~ a(¿L;¿P) < aM(¿P;¿L) < aM(¿L;¿L), permits a third, belief-driven, possi-
bility in which the time path of trade policy is characterized by a single transition from
the protectionist regime to freer trade; starting from a protectionist status quo, voters can
rationally expect reform to occur in the next period because the induced median voter in
the next period, aM(¿P;¿L), would indeed favor the liberal regime. It should be empha-
sized, however, that this potential for \organic" reform in is not consistent with Markov
perfect political equilibrium without some exogenous (and payo®-relevant) spark to induce
a shift in beliefs the period before liberalization occurs.17 To see this, consider a candi-
date political equilibrium time path of tari®s characterized by a (one time) transition from
the protectionist regime to the liberal tari® at time T. In a Markov perfect equilibrium,
the T ¡ 1 generation's beliefs about next period tari®s must be identical to the beliefs of
generation T ¡ 2 since the payo®-relevant state variables are identical at the time of each
generation's birth (before T). Thus, the only Markov perfect equilibrium possibilities are
political steady states, as speci¯ed in Proposition 2.7.
2.4 Existence of Multiple Political Steady States
The conditions under which multiple political steady states can obtain depends on pa-
rameter values and the choice of tari® alternatives ¿L and ¿P. A few simple observations
characterize the set of possibilities. Figure 4 illustrates.
Notice ¯rst that the fraction of skilled workers under a protectionist steady state,
µ(¿P;¿P), must be less than the fraction of skilled workers under the relatively liberal
steady state, µ(¿L;¿L), because ¿L < ¿P by assumption and µ is strictly decreasing in the
16The median voter that would obtain if the older generation had voted for protection when young but
expected liberalization in the second stage of life, a
M(¿P;¿L), would favor protection{ thus generating a
contradiction.
17The potential government role in spurring belief-induced reform is discussed further in Section 3.1.3 TRANSITION MECHANISMS 24
(steady state) tari® according to (2.8); thus, it must be true that aM(¿P;¿P) = µ(¿P;¿P) <
aM(¿L;¿L) = µ(¿L;¿L), ruling out the shaded region in Figure 4. Second, note that if less
than half of the population is skilled under even the more liberal tari® regime, so that
aM(¿P;¿P) < aM(¿L;¿L) < 1
2, then the median voter under either initial tari® regime must
be a member of the low ability group so that ¿P can be the only political steady state in
region IV of Figure 4. Conversely, if more than half of the population would be skilled
under even the more protectionist regime, so that 1
2 < aM(¿P;¿P) < aM(¿L;¿L) as in region
I of Figure 4, the indi®erent voter under either initial tari® regime must necessarily be a
member of the high ability group. This does not, imply, however, that there are necessarily
multiple political steady states or even that the more liberal regime is a steady state, since
even high ability voters may be protectionists (for example, if ¯ is very small). Finally, if
aM(¿P;¿P) < 1
2 < aM(¿L;¿L) there are two possibilities, both of which may (but need not)
give rise the multiple equilibria. First if aM(¿P;¿P) < 1 ¡ aM(¿L;¿L) as in region III, the
median voter starting from ¿P (¿L) will be a member of the low skill (medium skill) group
so that ¿P will de¯nitely be one steady state, but ¿L may or may not be politically stable as
well. Alternatively, if aM(¿P;¿P) > 1¡^ aM(¿L;¿L) as in region II, the median voter starting
from ¿P (¿L) will be a member of the middle skill (high skill) group so that ¿L, ¿P, or both
may be politically stable.18
The question that arises, then, is if the economy is in a \bad" equilibrium from national
welfare maximization standpoint { a protectionist rut characterized by the political steady
state under ¿P { whether and how it can transition to the more liberal steady state under
¿L. The answer is the focus of the next section, which explores the possibility of di®erent
mechanisms for transitioning between steady states.
3 Transition Mechanisms
In asking how a protectionist political steady state can be be escaped, we e®ectively assume
the existence of a third party agenda setter whose objective is national welfare maximization
18We have con¯rmed that each of the regions depicted in Figure 4 is non-empty for some reasonable set
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Figure 4: Potential Multiple Equilibria
{ i.e. trade liberalization. It is understood that the cause of transition out of steady state
must lie outside of the political process modeled so far, as the median voter under the
protectionist regime { once she is in place { has no interest in such a change. We argue that
our conceptual framework with a third party agenda setter is a reasonable approximation
to the political structure observed in many democracies, particularly in the determination
of trade policy. It is often the case that a few political elites | frequently un-elected
| de¯ne the structure of political platforms or the design of ballot referenda to be put
forward to the voting public. Indeed, this agenda setting extends beyond the populist vote
to the halls of representative democracy. In the United States, for instance, fast track
negotiating authority grants the President (who ostensibly represents the welfare objectives
of the country as a whole) the right to design the structure of proposed trade agreements,
each of which is subsequently sent to Congress (composed of heterogeneous district and
state representatives) only for the ¯nal up or down referendum.3 TRANSITION MECHANISMS 26
3.1 Announcements and Organic Political Change
Political stability hinges on agents' expectations over future trade policy. In particular, if
the economy is caught in the protectionist steady state, the high tari® regime is perpetuated
by agents' self-ful¯lling beliefs that the same regime will still be in place next period. And it
is this very belief that leads to skill acquisition decisions and a subsequent skill composition
which in turn bring about a median voter next period who decides to keep in place this
regime. One possibility to break away from this vicious circle is to alter agents' expectations
over future trade policy. If young workers anticipate freer trade in the future, they will
upgrade their skills accordingly. This anticipatory skill upgrading will in turn increase the
skill composition of the older generation in the next period and thus the future constituency
in favor of liberalization.
Notice that if the potential future constituency supporting free trade is su±ciently
large, an \organic" political shift from a protectionist steady state to a liberal steady state
is possible in political equilibrium, contingent on an exogenously induced shift in agents'
beliefs. To see this, suppose that ~ a(¿L;¿P) 2 [aM(¿P;¿P);aM(¿L;¿L)] so that both steady
states are political equilibria. Then, if starting from a protectionist steady state at time t¡1,
enough members of the then-young generation would upgrade their skills under the expec-
tation of more liberal trade at time t so that µt¡1 = µ(¿P;¿L) = aM(¿P;¿L) > ~ a(¿L;¿P), the
expectation of freer trade at time t is rational so that such an \organic" equilibrium transi-
tion from the protectionist regime to the liberal steady state marks a third form of political
equilibrium in addition two the two steady states, as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1 If aM(¿P;¿P) · ~ a(¿L;¿P) · aM(¿P;¿L) and ¿t = ¿P for all t · T,
then an exogenous change in beliefs of the young in period T from expecting protection to
expecting the liberal regime in period T +1 leads to a transition from the protectionist steady
state to the liberal steady state from period T + 1 onward.
At the same time, however, the assumption of Markov perfection implies that agents'
beliefs must be intertemporally stable; that is, agents cannot simply wake up one day with
new beliefs about the future. And so the question becomes how expectations can be altered3 TRANSITION MECHANISMS 27
to bring about reform. Forces that can bring about a change in anticipated future policy
could be new actors from either outside or inside the country itself. Inside actors could be el-
der statesmen or political pundits weighing in on trade policy or politicians' announcements
of anticipated future trade deals. Outside actors could be foreign governments pushing for
multilateral trade talks or applying political pressure for reform cast as \inevitable". Even
the popular press could bring about changes in beliefs { and thus reform { without changing
the parameters underlying the model simply by suggesting that change is on the horizon.19
In practice, the credibility of announcements will play an important role in shaping
expectations about the future, even if organic political reform is possible. We would expect
that an outside actor seeking to induce a shift in expectations would most likely need to
rely on a commitment device, such as an international treaty unless she possesses a form
of inherent credibility.20 See Staiger and Tabellini (1987) for more complete discussion of
mechanisms for enhancing government credibility.
3.2 External Terms of Trade Changes
The political support for trade reform depends in large part on the skill composition of
the population, which in turn is determined - apart from trade policy - by the terms of
trade, so far taken as given. A favorable shift in the country's terms of trade, by increasing
the relative price of the export good, makes skill acquisition more pro¯table and therefore
leads to a higher proportion of the population acquiring skills. By lowering the critical
ability level, it changes the identity of the median voter: her ability level is higher the more
favorable the terms of trade, as there are fewer unskilled individuals among the old who
oppose liberalization. At the same time, a change in the terms of trade has no ¯rst order
19Markov perfection requires that beliefs are based on payo®-relevant state variables, so such a change
in beliefs must be predicated on some \real" change in the state of the world. A vanishingly small lump
sum tax ² ! 0 would serve such purpose of changing state variables to free the belief structure without
meaningful secondary e®ects.
20While a senior representative from Vermont would be unlikely to convince voters of any impending
change, even a few casual words from a former Federal Reserve Chairman may convey the necessary gravitas
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e®ect on the identity of the indi®erent agent among the young. Thus:
Proposition 3.2 An exogenous improvement in the terms of trade increases the political
support for trade liberalization.
Among the many forces that could shift a country's terms of trade, we are especially
interested in trade policy decisions taken by trading partners. Suppose a large trading
partner liberalizes trade, for example by lowering the import tari® on the skill-intensive good
that the country under consideration exports to its partner. This unilateral liberalization
on part of the partner country will result in a favorable shift in the home country's terms
of trade. As outlined above the change in the terms of trade shifts the window of median
voters to the right. And as the median voters are of higher ability and more pro-trade, the
liberalized regime tends to become politically stable (if it was not), the transition equilibrium
becomes feasible, and the protectionist regime loses political stability.
This positive correlation between unilateral trade policy decisions by large trading
partners opens up the possibility of multiple equilibria in a non-cooperative international
trade policy game. The reason is that trade liberalization on part of the other country
makes domestic liberalization politically feasible, and vice versa.21 Such a multiplicity
of equilibria in the international context comes in addition to the inherent multiplicity of
equilibria that our model exhibits in a purely unilateral context. Indeed, the latter is among
the key novelties of our model, as we demonstrate the potential for multiple equilibria even
for small countries without any change in the terms of trade.22
3.3 Trade Adjustment Assistance: Temporary Education Subsidies
Another mechanism, apart from changing beliefs, to a®ect the skill composition and thereby
the decision on trade policy lies in altering directly the economic calculations that determine
the skill acquisition decision. The obvious way to in°uence this decision in the desired way
is to subsidize the acquisition of skills. This can be achieved by enacting a subsidy to
21This mechanism has been pioneered by Krishna and Mitra (2005) and Krishna and Mitra (2006).
22We are grateful to Devashish Mitra for emphasizing this point.3 TRANSITION MECHANISMS 29
education that reduces the cost of acquiring skill and is ¯nanced by a poll tax. By tilting
the balance in favor of skill acquisition, such a subsidy will improve the skill composition
of the cohort and | if su±ciently substantial | bring about a median voter who favors
trade liberalization. Note that once we have moved towards the new free-trade steady state,
the subsidy could be abolished if,as in the case of multiple political steady states, the new
liberal steady state is politically stable even without the subsidy.
Formally, let s 2 [0;c] denote the (gross) subsidy paid to every young agent who
decides to acquire skills, which reduces the cost of doing so from c to c ¡ s. This subsidy
must be funded and a balanced budget on part of the government implies that the poll tax
required to do so amounts to t = s
2
^ µt. Taking this into account, equation (2.2) that governs
the skill acquisition decision has to be modi¯ed as follows:
v(pt;1 ¡ (c ¡ s) ¡ t) + ¯v(pt+1;(1 + a)pt+1 ¡ t) ¸ v(pt;1 ¡ t) + ¯v(pt+1;1 ¡ t); (3.1)
where it has been assumed that the agent expects the policy to be in place for the two
periods of her lifetime.23 This results in the following modi¯ed critical ability level:
^ at(¿t;¿t+1) ´




¯pw ¿t+1 ¡ 1: (3.2)
Clearly, the education subsidy decreases the critical ability level and thus increases the
proportion of the cohort that decides to acquire skills. Note that the poll tax itself does not
directly in°uence the education decision as it has to be paid whether one acquires skills or
not.
Similar to the analysis in the baseline case, the skill acquisition decision determines
the identity of the median voter among the young, via the skill composition of the old
generation. In particular, the identity of the median voter in steady state is given by:
aM
t (¿t¡1;¿t) ´ ^ µt¡1(¿t¡1;¿t) = 2 ¡





As before the ability level of the median voter is decreasing in the steady state tari® level
because a higher tari® leads to more support for protection among the old. At the same
23Note that this assumption can be relaxed. Assuming the subsidy to be in place for one period would
only alter the value of the tax ,which has no e®ect on the skill acquisition decision.3 TRANSITION MECHANISMS 30
time, the education subsidy reduces the support for protection by increasing the number of
skilled older workers. Correspondingly, the median voter's ability level is increasing in the
education subsidy.
We now draw attention to how the education subsidy a®ects the identity of the in-
di®erent voter. As before, we have to distinguish two cases: the case where the indi®erent
voter acquires skills under both regimes and the case where she decides to acquire skills
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In the second, it is:
~ ah =
¿®
L(1 + ¯)(1 ¡ t0) ¡ ¿®
P(1 ¡ c + s ¡ (1 + ¯)t1)
¯p1
¡ 1: (3.5)
How does the education subsidy a®ect these identities? Di®erentiating with respect to the
subsidy s and taking into account the government's budget constraint, it is straightforward
to show that ~ a0
2(s) < ~ a0
1(s) < 0. We thus have:
Proposition 3.3 A poll-tax funded education subsidy s > 0 has the political e®ects
@~ am=@s < @~ ah=@s < 0 < @aM=@s
and thus increases (decreases) the political viability of the liberal (protectionist) steady state
regime.
We see that whereas the ability levels and hence the identities of the respective median
voter under each steady state increase with the education subsidy, the reverse happens to
the indi®erent voter. This increase in the ability level is more pronounced in the second
case, as the indi®erent voter acquires skills no matter what in the ¯rst case so that we
have only second order e®ects. This opens up the possibility that the ability level of the
indi®erent voter falls below the identity of the median voter in the protectionist steady
24Note that the case where the indi®erent voter never acquires skills (i.e. is of low ability) still cannot
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state. When this happens, the protectionist regime becomes politically unstable implying
the the education subsidy will cause a transition from the protectionist to the more liberal
regime with the ensuing welfare bene¯ts overall. Figure 5 illustrates:
Figure 5: The E®ect of Education Subsidies
It is important to note the less desirable side-e®ect of education subsidy on the (net
of transfers) wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers: because all workers are taxed
to pay for the education subsidy, the lowest ability workers who will remain unskilled even
in the presence of a subsidy are taxed at the expense of their higher ability contemporaries.
The tari® liberalizing bene¯t of blanket educational subsidies thus should be weighed against
the concomitant increase in income inequality between low and high ability agents. But
as pointed out above, once transition has occurred the education subsidy can as well be
abolished provided that the indi®erent voter has a lower ability level than the median in
the liberalized steady state without the education subsidy. The implied increase in income
inequality therefore would be temporary also.3 TRANSITION MECHANISMS 32
Taking a moment to relate the just derived results to the analysis in the earlier sub-
section on announcements and beliefs, note that the identity of the median voter in a
transitional period, aM(¿P;¿L) also moves to the right according to the general equation
(3.3) above. Even if the indi®erent agent does not lie to the left of the median voter under
protectionism, she could ¯nd herself to the left of the transitional median voter, aM(¿P;¿L).
This indicates that a combination of education subsidies and announcements can be suc-
cessful even if the education subsidy is not su±cient to render the protectionist steady state
politically unstable on its own. And again, the subsidy can be abolished in this scenario
once transition has been achieved.
3.4 Trade Adjustment Assistance: Transfers
Among the most commonly found policy supplements to trade reform in developed countries
are compensation schemes that partially o®set the losses faced by workers who are adversely
a®ected from trade liberalization. Unlike the transition mechanisms discussed thus far,
which appear to be suitable means to achieve freer trade, transfer programs designed to
compensate the losers from trade liberalization turn out to be counter-productive. This
result is particularly striking given that unemployment compensation or wage \top ups"
are a prominent component of most countries' existing trade adjustment assistance (TAA)
programs.
In order to compensate workers in import competing sectors, TAA transfer programs
must tax the winners from trade reform. In our context, this implies that transfers depress
the skill premium since the economy is assumed to hold comparative advantage in the skill-
based good. Similar to the educational subsidies analyzed above, this changes the economic
pro¯tability of skill acquisition, but now in the opposite direction. Skill acquisition becomes
less attractive under such a policy and this makes trade liberalization even harder to achieve
politically, even though the trade adjustment component makes it appear more palatable
at ¯rst sight.
Formally, suppose the unskilled old receive a subsidy s per person as soon as trade3 TRANSITION MECHANISMS 33
liberalization is enacted.25 To balance the budget the government needs to raise taxes and
it does so by introducing a poll tax of t to be paid by the skilled.26 Modifying the model
accordingly, we can derive the new critical ability level for skill acquisition:
^ at(¿t;¿t+1) ´




¯pw ¿t+1 ¡ 1: (3.6)
Clearly, the subsidy s and the tax t have to satisfy the government budget constraint,
^ at¡1(¿t¡1;¿t)s = (1¡^ at¡1(¿t¡1;¿t))t, where we note that the cut-o® ability level re°ects the
skill composition of the older generation. Substituting the budget constraint and totally











1 + t=(^ a(¿L;¿L)2pt+1)
^ a(¿L;¿L)pt+1
> 0; (3.8)
whereas the critical ability level under steady state protectionism remains unchanged as
no compensation ever takes place. Accordingly, the median voter under the liberal steady
state is now of a lower ability type, as | less pronounced | is her transitional counterpart,
whereas the median voter under the protectionist steady state is of the same type as without
transfers. In other words, the respective median voters tend to move left, contrary to our
results for the education subsidy.
We turn now to the indi®erent agent. If she is a member of the medium ability group,




L (1 + ¯) ¡ (1 ¡ c)
¯pw ¿L ¡ 1 +
t
pw¿L: (3.9)
















25The unskilled young cannot expect such a payment as they still have the option to acquire skills.
26Note that the skilled with relatively low ability actually lose from trade liberalization. However, trade
adjustment programs typically do not make this distinction, basing compensation on employment status
rather than overall worker welfare.3 TRANSITION MECHANISMS 34
It is clear that both possible indi®erent agents move to the right, i.e. are now of a higher
ability type.
Given that the median voters under the transitional equilibrium and especially under
the liberal steady state move left, and the indi®erent agents move right, we conclude that
the political feasibility of trade liberalization diminishes:
Proposition 3.4 Trade adjustment assistance to the unskilled workers in the older gener-
ation, ¯nanced by a poll-tax t, has the political e®ects
@aM(¿L;¿L)=@t < @aM(¿P;¿L)=@t < 0 < @~ am=@t < @~ ah=@t
and thus decreases (increases) the political viability of the liberal (protectionist) steady state
regime.
Transfer augmented trade liberalization might not be politically stable at all, even if
without transfers liberalization would have been, or it might not be reachable by a shift in
beliefs only. That is, we have the perverse e®ect that transfers, though seemingly appealing,
actually render trade liberalization more di±cult or even impossible to achieve.
3.5 Radical Reform
This section explores a di®erent thought experiment, asking whether there are precondi-
tions on the structure of a liberalization referendum necessary for reform to be possible { or
conversely, if starting from a liberal policy regime, there exist some forms of protectionist
proposals that necessarily would induce the economy to revert to protectionism. As dis-
cussed earlier, we are e®ectively asking how a third party agenda setter (not the median
voter) could in°uence the extant and future political steady state by altering the structure
of referendum proposals.
From the analysis in Section 2.2 it is clear that the existence of any political steady
state depends not only on the status quo tari®, but also on the alternative regime, since the
identity of the indi®erent voter (and hence implicitly the trade preferences of the median
voter) depend on the pair of tari® alternatives; i.e. ~ a ´ ~ a(¿L;¿P). The policy question is3 TRANSITION MECHANISMS 35
then: starting from a given regime, which proposed tari® alternatives (if any) would ensure
that the status quo is maintained as the unique political steady state, which would lead
to an unambiguous regime shift by making the status quo politically unstable, and which
referendum alternatives would admit the already much discussed possibility of multiple
equilibria? We assume that the referendum must be structured as a choice between the
status quo and some alternative regime,27 and we refer to a proposed tari® alternative as
\reform" if it decreases the tari® and as \entrenchment" otherwise.
Perhaps surprisingly, we ¯nd that the best way to block reform (apart from o®ering
entrenching tari® proposals) is to propose a relatively minor tari® liberalization. Starting
from a protectionist steady state, a tari® liberalization referendum is sure to fail for a suf-
¯ciently small reform step, since (tautologically) lim¿0!¿P aM(¿P;¿0) = aM(¿P;¿P). That
is, the median voter who would obtain if voters rationally expected a shift from the protec-
tionist regime to the alternative regime is vanishingly close to the status quo protectionist
median voter, as the reform step converges to zero.
Proposition 3.5 There exists a su±ciently small critical reform step size ¢ such that the
status quo tari® ¿P is politically stable against any alterntive tari® ¿0 < ¿P if ¿P ¡ ¿0 < ¢.
One way to see the point is in Figure 4. Suppose for example that aM(¿P;¿P) · 1
2,
and that, for some initial tari® alternative, ¿0 < ¿P, µ(¿0;¿0) = aM(¿0;¿0;) ¸ 1
2 so that
the initial tari® proposal may admit multiple political steady states under Region II or III.
Decreasing the reform step by decreasing ¢ then causes aM(¿0;¿0) to move left, toward
aM(¿P;¿P), eventually pushing the economy into Region IV where the only political steady
state is the protectionist regime.
Figure 6 o®ers an alternative demonstration using a numerical example to evaluate
27Alternative assumptions both would be inconsistent with the nature of referenda (almost always a choice
about whether or not to adopt a policy change), but also would yield uninteresting results. (The agenda
setter could ensure a political shift simply by making the two prosed regimes di®erent from the status quo
(and vanishingly similar), and could maintain the status quo simply by o®ering the degenerate \choice"
between the status quo and itself.)3 TRANSITION MECHANISMS 36
the range of tari® liberalization proposals that admit multiple steady states.28 Given an
initial benchmark protectionist regime, ¿P, and set of parameter values (®;¯;c;pw), we
can derive the identities of both the median and the indi®erent voters among the young
generation as a function of the proposed tari® alternative, ¿.29 Focussing on the case of tari®
reform, we assume that ¿ · ¿P.30 For values of the tari® alternative at which ~ a(¿P;¿) >
aM(¿;¿) (the median voter under the proposed liberal regime would favor protectionism),
the unique political steady state will be the protectionist regime. Alternatively, proposed
tari® alternatives under which ~ a(¿P;¿) < aM(¿;¿), support two political steady states {
both the proposed alternative and the protectionist status quo.
Figure 6: Minimum Reform Step
28We thank Devashish Mitra for suggesting this form of graphical representation.
29For the purposes of demonstration and ease of calculation, we set ® ´ :5;c ´ :5;¯ ´ 1;p
w ´ 1:5; and
¿P = 1:75.
30We note that the alternative case of tari® entrenchment is simply the inverse of the scenario discussed
herein.4 CONCLUSION 37
It is immediate that there exists a range of tari® reform proposals, ¿ 2 (¿;¿P) that are
too modest to admit even the possibility of reform, since they are not themselves politically
stable. Conversely, more radical tari® reform proposals { those with a reform step greater
than ¢ { are politically stable and therefore permit the potential for reform through the
policy channels identi¯ed in earlier subsections. Intuitively, since voters' preferences are
unambiguously protectionist or pro free trade, no voter would strictly prefer a small reform
to radical reform; there are no moderate voters (except the zero-mass indi®erent voter), only
two extremist voter blocks. Reducing the magnitude of the reform step therefore serves only
to decrease the potential consistency of skilled workers who would favor liberalization.
Our ¯nding that radical reform may be necessary to generate the political support
for tari® reform parallels the similar ¯nding by Krishna and Mitra (2006) whose intuition
applies equally in this context: because voters' political allegiances depend on their (net
lifetime) sectoral orientation, and are monotonically increasing in the relative price of the
good in which they have comparative advantage, a big shift in the proportion of the popu-
lation employed in the export oriented (skill-based) sector is necessary to generate political
support for reform. But while in their model, shifting workers' sectoral orientation requires
exogenous changes in terms of trade, this section demonstrates that (potential) political
support for tari® reform can be generated by su±ciently radical liberalization proposals.
4 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the dynamic political economy aspects of tari® reform in the presence
of populist politics. The model is designed in such a way to capture (i) a dynamic envi-
ronment, speci¯cally the potential in°uence of current policy on the identity (not just the
policy preferences) of the median voter, (ii) the political frictions both within and across
generations borne of di®erent abilities to adjust to changing economic conditions, and (iii)
the endogeneity of voters' preferences and choices with current and expected economic con-
ditions. Populations can and do evolve in response to economic conditions, even in the
presence of myopic preferences; this paper constructs a simple model to evaluate how and4 CONCLUSION 38
why these changes can (and sometimes do not) occur.
We ¯nd that multiple political steady states may exist within an economy, and thus,
that voters can potentially get stuck in a protectionist rut despite that aggregate welfare
would be higher under a more liberal tari® regime. A series of thought experiments and
comparative statics exercises demonstrate that the multiplicity of political equilibria can
be broken through a number of third party induced changes. We discuss several potential
mechanisms for escaping the protectionist rut: announcements of future policy commit-
ments (for instance, preferential trade agreement talks) that change young voters' beliefs
about the future; terms of trade improvements triggered by trading partners' unilateral
tari® reforms; temporary education subsidies that reduce the cost of skill acquisition and
thus increase the political constituency in favor of open markets; and structuring referenda
to put forward substantial reform packages rather than minor policy changes. We also ¯nd,
perhaps provocatively, that transfer payments to negatively impacted workers in the import-
competing sectors will reduce the potential for reform unless they are carefully constructed
in such a way that they do not in°uence young workers' skill acquisition decisions.
There are a number of promising extensions to be pursued in subsequent research.
From a theoretical perspective, it would be interesting to move away from the restricted set
of Markov perfect equilibria to explore the further the role of beliefs and sun-spot equilibria.
Empirically, cross country panel studies could explore the potential in°uence of variations
in educational access, cost, and education, di®erential voter turnout across generations,
and welfare programs on the success of trade reform and public rati¯cation of regional
integration agreements. Finally, one could envision formal policy analysis of the optimal
structure of the trade adjustment assistance (TAA) programs focussed on generational
di®erences that would o®er transfer payments to \buy out" old unskilled workers, while
o®ering only education subsidies to younger, less able, workers.REFERENCES 39
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A1 Autarkic Equilibrium
The autarkic equilibrium price, pa, and skill composition of the older generation, µ(pa), are

















Where the ¯rst expression is derived from the market clearing condition,31 and the second























qu(µ(pa)):A2 TARIFF REVENUE 42
boundary conditions that by de¯nition 0 · µ · 1. Solving yields the parametric form of




((1 ¡ ®)c + ¯(1 + ®(1 + c)))2 ¡ 2®¯((1 ¡ ®)c + ¯(1 + ®(1 + 2c)))
2(1 ¡ ®)¯
: (A1.3)
Notice that the Cobb-Douglas preference structure (with ® 2 (0;1)) ensures that the
economy will be diversi¯ed in autarky. Thus, we know that µ(pa) > 0 so that the lower
boundary condition on µ will not bind. It is possible, however, to reach a corner solution
in which µ(pa) = 1; even if every agent is skilled in the second period of life, the young
generation will produce a positive quantity of the unskilled good as long as c < 1. The




¯(1¡c); that is, every worker will upgrade
her skills under autarky for su±ciently high values of ® (strong preference for the skill-based
good) or ¯ (a low discount rate). Conversely, the boundary condition is certain not to bind
in the limit as c ! 1.
A2 Tari® Revenue
This appendix investigates how the paper's results are a®ected by the collection and redis-
tribution of tari® revenue. As is customary in the literature, we assume that in each period
tari® revenue is distributed uniformly among the members of the population. Denoting the
aggregate tari® revenue at time t by Rt, this implies that each agent alive at time t receives
a demogrant of rt = Rt=2.
It is clear that uniform redistribution of tari® revenue will not a®ect individuals' skill
acquisition decisions. To see this, note that equation (2.2) has to be augmented with the
inclusion of tari® revenue as follows:
v(pt;1 ¡ c + rt) + ¯v(pt+1;(1 + a)pt+1 + rt+1) ¸ v(pt;1 + rt) + ¯v(pt+1;1 + rt+1): (A2.1)
Evaluating the inequality, the tari® revenue payments cancel immediately, since the marginal
utility of income is constant under Cobb-Douglas preferences. Thus, we have that every
agents' skill acquisition decision{ and hence the identity of the median voter{ is independent
of the (uniform) tari® revenue rebate, rt.A2 TARIFF REVENUE 43
The tari® revenue rebate clearly does carry important implications for individuals'
preferences over trade policy, as the payment generally will vary with the tari®. We can
solve the modi¯ed model to generate the following expression for the per capita tari® rebate





®cµt + (2(1 ¡ ®)
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1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(¿t ¡ 1)
(A2.2)
Tautologically, tari® revenue is zero under a free trade regime (¿ = 1). Likewise, as the
tari® approaches the prohibitive level, tari® revenue must again fall back to zero. But
within the intermediate range of positive, non-prohibitive tari®s, revenue is a positive and
concave function of the tari®: starting from free trade, revenue at ¯rst increases with the
tari® until the revenue maximizing tari® is reached, and then revenue falls with the tari®
approaching the prohibitive level.
Returning to our main analysis, a choice between any two tari® regimes entails a
change in tari® revenue that can be positive, negative, or possibly zero. This revenue e®ect
will in general change the identity of the indi®erent voter, although it does not a®ect the
identities of the respective median voters as noted earlier.
Consider, for illustration, a case in which tari® revenue is lower for ¿L than for ¿P.32
The loss in tari® revenue that accompanies liberalization (or the forgone increase in revenue
from maintained liberalism) { which we did not consider in the main text { makes ¿L some-
what less attractive relative to ¿P and therefore increases the ability level of the indi®erent
voter relative to the case in which tari® revenue is discarded. This rightward shift in ~ a may
jeopardize the political stability of the liberal regime while strengthening the stability of
the more protectionist tari®. And indeed, if both tari® regimes constituted political steady
states when ignoring tari® revenue, it is possible that uniform redistribution of the collected
tari® receipts could completely undercut the political stability of the liberal regime so that
the ¿P would constitute the unique political steady state.
In sum, while the redistribution of tari® revenue in general will in°uence the identity
of the indi®erent voter within the population and thus the potential multiplicity of political
32Normative economics would suggest that this case is the more relevant, in which liberalization brings a
concomitant loss in tari® revenue. Note that the opposite case is simply the mirror image.A2 TARIFF REVENUE 44
steady states given any set of exogenous parameter values, it does not change the qualitative
conclusions of the main text.CESifo Working Paper Series 
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